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BETWEEN LAW AND VIRTUE 
Joseph P. Tomain· 
Barbara C. Watts·· 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal ethics and professionalism have not enjoyed a comfortable 
alliance throughout the history of the legal profession in this country. 
Even before the concept of professionalism attained its current notoriety, 
ethics scholars, code drafters, and committee reporters addressing legal 
ethics have found it difficult to satisfy two needs of professional behavior. 
The first need is for a disciplinary code to guide lawyer conduct so that 
the profession can police itself and maintain public confidence. The 
second need is for an aspirational code of directions for leading a good 
life as a lawyer. It may well be the case that the profession cannot 
capture these two perhaps incompatible needs in one document; 
understanding the relationship between legal ethics and professionalism 
remains important, nevertheless. Such an understanding can lead not 
only to greater awareness of professionalism, but can also lead to 
educational opportunities for law students and lawyers alike. 
Legal ethics, professional responsibility, and professionalism are 
timely topics as lawyers continually reevaluate the standards of their 
profession, particularly in light of the challenges of multidisciplinary and 
multijurisdictional practice, as well as the embarrassment facing lawyers 
involved in and surrounding the Enron collapse. 
In this article, our goal is to discuss how to think and talk about ethics 
and professionalism. By way of preview, we need to understand that 
ethics and professionalism use different vocabularies and, consequently, 
talk past each other to some extent. Our hope is that understanding the 
existence of these two vocabularies helps reduce the misunderstanding. 
Both the areas of legal ethics and of professionalism are dynamic and 
both are a part oflegal education and continuing professional education. 
Legal ethics and professional responsibility have been a required part of 
legal education since Watergate. Today, professionalism and profes-
sional training are becoming an increasing part of law school and post 
law school instruction. I 
* Dean & Nippert Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
** Associate Dean, University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
I. Such training is an accreditntion requirement. ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDt:C. & Amnsslo:-,;s TO 
THE BAR, STA;\DARDS FOR ApPROVAL FOR LAW SCHOOLS § 302(b) (1998). Section 302(b) provides: 
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In Part I we trace briefly the history of legal ethics in the United 
States and discuss the fundamental conflict that prevents aspiration and 
discipline from residing in the same space. Part II elaborates on the 
concept of professionalism and discusses current efforts to give content 
to professionalism for purposes of teaching it to law students and 
promoting it with lawyers. 
I. LEGAL ETHICS 
A. The Virtue of Princes 
According to legend, just before his death on 21 June 1527, Niccolo 
Machiavelli told the faithful friends who had stayed with him to the 
very end about a dream he had had, a dream that over the centuries 
became renowned as "Machiavelli's dream." 
In his dream, Machiavelli had seen a band of poorly dressed men, 
ragged and miserable in appearance. He asked them who they were. 
They replied, "We are the saintly and the blessed; we are on our way 
to Heaven." Then he saw a crowd of solemnly attired men, noble and 
grave in appearance, speaking seriously of important political matters. 
In their midst he recognized the great philosophers and historians of 
antiquity who had written fundamental works on politics and the state, 
such as Plato, Plutarch, and Tacitus. Again, he asked them who they 
were and where they were going. "We are the damned of Hell" was 
their answer. After telling his friends of his dream, Machiavelli 
remarked that he would be far happier in Hell, where he could discuss 
politics with the great men of the ancient world, than in Heaven, 
where he would languish in boredom among the blessed and the 
saintly.2 
What does Machiavelli's dream have to tell us about legal ethics? 
Simply, Machiavelli, more particularly his notion of virtU, defines our 
modern understanding of legal ethics. Machiavelli's virtU separated 
morality from politics. A good politician was someone who could 
acquire and maintain power. According to Machiavelli, it is not at all 
necessary for a good politician to be a good man, desirable though that 
A law school shall require all students in the J.D. program to receh'e instruction in the 
history, goals, structure, duties, values, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its 
members, included in the I'dodd Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar 
Association. A law school should involve members of the bench and bar in this instruction. 
Professionalism continuing legal education is also required in Ohio. SCPo CT. RCLES FOR THE GO"'T OF 
OHIOX-. 
2. !\[ACRIZIO VI ROLl, NICCOLO'S S~IILE: A BIOGRAPHY OF MACHI.<\ "ELLI 3 (Anthony Shugaar 
trans., 2000). 
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may be. Similarly today, a good lawyer plays just within the disciplinary 
rules and need not be a good man, desirable though that may be. 
Before returning t6 Machiavelli, however, we need to review another, 
somewhat more modem, quotation only about 165 years old from 
Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America: "Hidden at the bottom of 
the souls oflawyers one therefore finds a part of the tastes and habits of 
the aristocracy.,,3 When de Tocqueville linked lawyers with the 
aristocracy he did not do so pejoratively. Quite the opposite. He saw 
American lawyers as protectors against abuses by the democratic 
majority. For de Tocqueville, "Lawyers therefore form the superior 
political class and the most intellectual position of society.,,4 
Machiavelli and de Tocqueville may seem, may even be, an odd 
pairing, odder still for a look at contemporary legal ethics. However, 
the connection is simply this: In early 19th century America, at the 
dawn of American legal ethics, de Tocqueville perceived lawyers as 
aristocrats, as princes. Then who better than Machiavelli to describe 
the "virtue" of princes. Coincidentally, or even ironically, Machiavelli's 
conception of princely virtue is exactly that adopted by and embedded 
in 21 st century legal ethics codes. This sleight-of-hand traveling through 
the centuries is a remarkable story, and the conclusion is best under-
stood by what legal ethics is not. Legal ethics is not professionalism. 
Also, today's legal ethics is not morality-it is regulatory politics. 
Machiavelli's dream of politics is as true for lawyers today as it was for 
ambitious would-be Renaissance diplomats. 
B. United States History 
The standard story oflegal ethics in the United States finds its roots 
in the not so dim mists of the early 19th century and remains the current 
story we tell. . This history· reveals the tension between the formal 
disciplinary rules of professional behavior and the desire for a broader 
moral ethos. 5 
David Hoffman, a Baltimore lawyer, has been called the father of 
American legal ethics.6 As an educator, Hoffman offered a course of 
legal study first published in 1817 and later published in two volumes in 
3. ALEXIS DE TOCQt:EVILLE, DE~IOCRACY 1:,\ A~IERICA 252 (Harvey C. l\lanslield & Delba 
Winthrop trans., 2000). 
4. /d. at 256. 
5. See, t.g., Allen K. Harris, Th; Professionalism Crisis-Tht ".(''' lVord5 and Olhtl' Rambo Tactics: 77lt 
Cotiftl'mce if ChidJustice Solutions, 53 S.C.L. REV. 549 (2002); W. Bradley Wendel, Xonlegal Regultztion if the 
11gal Profession: Social.Yurms in Prifessional Communities, 54 \'A:-\D. L. REV. 1955 (2001). 
6. THmlAS L. ScHAFFER, A~IERICA:-\ LEG.<\L ETHICS 59 (1985). 
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1836. It was the later edition in which he listed "Some Rules for a 
Lawyer's Conduct Throughout Life." The rules contain fifty "Resolu-
tions in Regard to Professional Deportment" such as: respond to letters 
(Rule 36); avoid envy (Rule 37); do not disregard the feelings of 
witnesses under examination (Rule 42); and avoid avarice (Rule 49).7 
Hoffman's work clearly imports then-contemporary morality into his 
understanding of legal ethics. Indeed, he proclaims that it is the office 
of the legal vocation "to vindicate the laws of God and man." He 
counsels that if a lawyer is "persuaded that [a] client's claim or defense 
cannot, or rather ought not to be sustained, [the lawyer] will promptly 
advise him to abandon it.,,8 Hoffman's sense oflegal ethics is clearly one 
of personal morality in which he admonishes lawyers to adopt good 
morals as habit or virtue.9 
A bit of local pride requires us to mention that the first dean of the 
University of Cincinnati College of Law, Timothy Walker, was also 
instrumental in the development oflegal ethics. His book, Introduction to 
American Law, first published in 1837, was the key legal text for American 
students of law for most of the 19th century, including no lesser a 
personage thanJustice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Most of Walker's book 
involves substantive law, but at the end he addresses legal ethics as he 
describes for his readers the "ways and means of professional success." 
There is something modern, maybe timeless, about Walker's critical 
attitude toward lawyers. He writes: "The vulgar notion is, that lawyers 
are seldom honest men." And lawyers are considered "errant naves." 
Walker concludes his set oflectures with an admonishment of the need 
for professional integrity. A career in law is not the path to riches, 
rather it is the path to independence, "which is all a wise man need 
desire."JO For Walker, the keys to successful practice are knowledge of 
the law; dedication; professional integrity; and the avoidance of 
"pettifogging." J J Walker's opinion oflawyers clearly is more realistic 
and closer to our own while Hoffman's is more hopeful. Walker's 
approach is more "Thou Shall Not" rather than "Blessed be the 
Peacemaker." And to put the matter another way, for Walker, legal 
ethics is about conduct that is prohibited rather than about behavior 
that will make a lawyer a better person, as Hoffman hoped. 
7. DAVID HOFF~JA:-;, A COt.:RSEOF LEGALSTt.:DY 767-75 (2d ed. 1846). 
8. Id. at 754 (emphasis added). 
9. Ethics as virtue, or ''''irtue ethics" has a distinguished lineage. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, 
NICmIACHAE:-; ETHICS; ALO\SDAIR !\[AC[:\TYRE, AHER \'IRTt.:E (2d ed. 1984); jt.:STI:-; OAKLEY & DEA:-; 
COCKI:-;G, \'IRTt.:E ETHICS A:-;D PROFESSIO:O\AL ROLES (200 I). 
10. TI~IOTHY WALKER, I:\TROnt.:CTlO:-; TO A~IERICA:-; LA\\" 670 (II th ed. 1905). 
II. /d. at 670-71. 
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Judge George Sharswood of Philadelphia followed Hoffman and 
Walker, and his 1854 Essay on Profissional Ethics I 2 became the standard 
and most influential work on the subject. With Sharswood, professional 
ethics takes a formal tum as Sharswood adopts a position familiar to us. 
The guilty client, for example, can be represented because it is a 
lawyer's duty to do so, and it is the system, not the individual lawyer, 
that judges guilt or innocence based upon fair arguments arising from 
the evidence. Thus, early on, between Hoffman and Sharswood, the 
development of legal ethics revealed the tension between moral 
prescription and formal disciplinary rule. 
The first code of professional ethics was adopted by the Alabama 
State Bar Association in 1887 13 and was based upon Sharswood's 
lectures. Thirty years later, the American Bar Association adopted its 
first canons of ethics based on the Alabama code. Both the Alabama 
Code of Ethics and the 1908 ABA Canons set out a series of duties to be 
observed by lawyers, such as upholding the institution and laws of the 
state and of the United States and the need for respect of courts,judges, 
each other, clients, and the public. Largely hortatory, the 1908 Canons 
were addressed to trial lawyers. It must be noted that these rules had no 
legal effect until they were adopted by individual states and enforced by 
that jurisdiction's courts in lawyer disciplinary actions. 14 
The 1908 Canons served as a forerunner to the 1969 ABA Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which was the outcome of 
a committee appointed in 1964 by then ABA President Louis F. Powell, 
Jr. Like the 1908 Canons, the CPR did not have the force oflaw until 
adopted by a state, usually a state's supreme court. Unlike the 1908 
Canons, the CPR had more disciplinary bite. 
The CPR was widely adopted and consists of four parts: Canons, 
Disciplinary Rules, Ethical Considerations, and Definitions. Notably, 
versions of the CPR remain in effect in Ohio, New York, and other 
states. 15 The Canons set norms, such as " [a] lawyer should represent a 
client zealously within the bounds of the law.,,16 A Canon is followed by 
Ethical Considerations which elaborate on this duty, such as "[w]hile 
serving as an advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client 
doubts as to the bounds of the law."I7 Ethical Considerations are 
12. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (3d ed. 1869). 
13. I\tP. Armstrong,Jr.,A Century qfLegal Ethics, 64 A.B.A.]. 1063 (1978). 
14. CHARLES W. WOLFRA~I, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2 (1986). 
15. In addition to New York and Ohio, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, Oregon, and Tennessee still reiyon 
the CPR. THO~!AS D. MORGAN & RO:,\ALD D. ROTCNDA, 2002 SELECTED STA:'\DARDS 0:'\ 
PROFESSIO:,\ALRESPO:,\SIBIUTY 146-47 (2002). 
16. OHIO REV. CODE Ax:'\. CODE OF PROF'L RESPOXSIBIUTY Canon 7 (1970). 
17. /d. at EC 7-3. 
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interpretive guides and, thus, are aspirational as opposed to prescriptive 
and contain no disciplinary force. 
The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory and "state the minimum level 
of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to 
disciplinary action." 18 In Disciplinary Rule 7-101, for example, a lawyer 
may be disciplined if his representation extends to "conduct that [a 
lawyer] believes to be unlawfu1.,,19 
The 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility was subject to its own 
criticisms. Discipline is narrowly imposed; the CPR is also written 
mainly for trial lawyers rather than transactional or in-house lawyers; 
aspirational goals go unrealized; and the CPR does not keep pace with 
a profession remarkably changed by technological advances, increasing 
competition, and decreasing loyalty. 
Simply, a one size fits all code of ethical behavior and professional 
responsibility is inadequate to contemporary professional needs. As the 
size of the profession significandy increased, private law firms got larger, 
the practice oflaw diversified in terms of demographics, practice areas, 
and career tracks, and law became more technology driven and more 
complex as well as more "professionalized" as firms turned to marketing 
and public relations.20 Changes in government regulation, multijurisdic-
tional practice, class action lawsuits, and institutional litigation all contri-
buted to a demand for a reappraisal of the CPR. 
ABA leadership appointed a committee in 1977 that redrafted the 
Code of Professional Responsibility through the leadership of Omaha, 
Nebraska lawyer Robert]. Kutak. The Kutak Commission served from 
1977 to 1983, at which time the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (Model Rules) were issued. The Model Rules were controver-
sial because of their more ambitious proposals, such as limiting client 
confidentiality; mandating pro bono work by every lawyer; limiting the 
kinds of cases that the lawyer could accept; regulating of conflicts 
aggressively; requiring a full disclosure and fairness in trials and 
18. /d. at PREFACE. 
19. /d. at DR 7-101(B)(2). 
20. Changes in the legal profession have been dramatic over the last two decades and critics have 
been unsparing in their criticism. The most recent criticism has been sounded on a particularly trenchant 
note-most of it comes from legal professionals-Iawyers,judges, and law teachers-rather than from the 
public. See A1\'THONYKRO:-lMAN, THELOsTL"I\"YER: FAIUNG ID.EALSOFTHELEGALPROFESSIO:-l (1993); 
1' ... IARY A:-IN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER L"WYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFF~~SION IS 
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); SOL LlNOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFE.~SION: L"WYERING 
AT THE END OF THE 20TH CE1\'TURY (1994); DEBORAH L.RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: 
REFOR~HNG THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); WALTER BENNETT, THE L"WYER'S MYTH: REVIVING 
IDEAI_~ IN THE LEGAL PROFE.~SION (2001); WILUA~f H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY 
OF LA\WER'S ETHICS (1998). 
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negotiations; and expanding permissible limits on advertising and 
solicitation. 
The Model Rules begin with a Preamble setting underlying philoso-
phy. The Scope section attempts to place the Model Rules in a larger 
context. The bulk of the Model Rules is taken up with fifty-two Rules 
with explanatory commentary. Some of the rules are pointedly 
disciplinary in nature. Others provide for more discretion and may 
involve discipline. Others are prescriptive only. Again, the Model Rules 
succeed more as a minimal disciplinary code than as a behavioral guide. 
C. Ethics 2000 and The Law Governing Lawyers 
The controversy surrounding the Model Rules and the growing 
popular dissatisfaction with the legal profession led to the appointment 
of yet another ABA commission to undertake a comprehensive review 
of the 1983 Model Rules. 
In 1997, the ABA appointed a Commission on the Evaluation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, chaired by Chief Justice E. Norman 
Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court, and that body, known as the 
Ethics 2000 Commission, issued its report in November of 2000.21 
According to the Report, one of the reasons to evaluate the Model Rules 
was the growing disparity in state ethics codes. The Report states that 
forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted some version 
of the Model Rules and that significant differences in the state versions 
resulted in significant lack of uniformity. 
In addition to the disparities in the ethics codes among the states, the 
Ethics 2000 Commission felt that technological developments so gready 
affected the delivery of legal services that the explosive dynamics of 
modern law practice sent "a sense of urgency" to the project,22 
Ethics 2000 retains the "basic architecture,,23 of the Model Rules and 
the sense that the primary function of the rules is disciplinary, rather 
than a set of "best practices" or professionalism concepts. Ethics 2000 
reintroduces the basic tension between ethics and professionalism. The 
Commission dearly opted to maintain a set of rules that established 
minimum standards that must be achieved before subjecting a lawyer to 
disciplinary practices, as opposed to the aspirational values of profes-
sionalism concepts. The Commission "tinker[ ed] with the ... Model 
21. ABA, REPORT OF THE CmnnSSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIO:-lAL 
CO:-lDUCT (2000) [hereinafter ETHICS 2000]. 
22. ld. at xi. 
23. ld. at xii. 
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Rules"24 and made a large number of small changes, the most significant 
of which involved communications with clients, informed consent, 
allocation of authority, confidentiality, and conflicts. What is more 
noteworthy is what the Commission did not do. It did not amend 
prohibitions on multidisciplinary practice, nor did it vote to make pro 
bono service mandatory, rather keeping it voluntary. 
In summer 2001 the ABA House of Delegates began to review Ethics 
2000, and the provisions that captured most of the publicity indicate the 
endurance of Machiavelli's dream. Rule 1.6(b) of Ethics 2000 proposed 
that a 
lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(I) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
[and] 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client 
has used or is using the lawyer's services[.] 
Mter a scholastic debate worthy of St. Thomas Aquinas, the House 
adopted (I) and struck (2). At first glance, certainly we can all agree that 
life is more important than property. Yet, as lawyers, how do we really 
feel about furthering crime? Would the House of Delegates vote the 
same way post-Enron/ Arthur Andersen? What would David Hoffman 
have said? Or de Tocqueville for that matter? Most likely, Machiavelli 
would have approved. 
While the ABA's Ethics 2000 was under consideration, the American 
Law Institute was concluding its fifteen-year restatement project entitled 
1he Law Governing Lawyers. Although intended as complementary to the 
CPR and the Model Rules, the Restatement goes "well beyond the 
scope of the ethics codes in alljurisdictions."25 More particularly, while 
the bite of ethics codes lies in disciplinary proceedings that can result in 
suspension or disbarment, the Restatement addresses civil liability 
through malpractice and recognizes civil liability to non-clients. While 
the Restatement undertakes to restate much of the law governing 
lawyers, it does not cover all of it and is not co-extensive with the ethics 
codes. The Restatement, for example, omits extensive consideration of 
advertising and solicitation, the right to counsel, group legal services, 
and court-awarded attorney fees. 
24. Sleven C. Krane, Ethics 2000; I Vhat Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. L. REV. 323 (1999). 
25. RF_~TATE~iE:\T (THIRD) OF THE Lo\\\' Gm'ER:-<I:-<G LO\\\,YERS (2001). 
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The distinguishing feature between Ethics 2000 and the Restatement 
is the function each assumes regarding the regulation oflawyer conduct. 
Ethics 2000 clearly rejects assuming a regulatory function,26 while the 
Restatement embraces it, albeit to a limited extent.27 The Restatement 
recognizes that lawyer behavior is regulated by moral, professional, and 
legal constraints while focusing on the legal constraints affecting 
discipline and liability. Like all of the ALI restatements, 1he Law 
Governing Lawyers is both comprehensive and scholarly, so scholarly in 
fact that it may well be of more use to law professors than to daily 
practitioners. Nevertheless, it provides an important compendium of 
decisional law should one ever need it. 
D. 1he Virtue rif Princes Redux 
Having traced the history of ethics codes from 1817 Baltimore to 
Chicago 2001, it is time to return to Machiavelli. 
By all accounts, Niccolo Machiavelli was a true Renaissance 
humanist28 whose thought was best realized in his enduring job 
application to Lorenzo de Medici-1he Prince.29 But what does a book 
written over 450 years ago by a sometime Florentine bureaucrat have 
to say to us down through the centuries? Particularly a book so often 
referred to dismissively as a how-to manual? Today we can expect to 
find a shelf or two devoted to Machiavelli in the self-help section of the 
local bookstore stocked with such titles as: Machiavelli and Management; 
1he Princessa: Machiavellifor Women; or Machiavelli on Modern Leadership.30 
It would not be surprising to find a volume entitled Machiavelli for 
Lawyers. 
1he Prince is generally considered the first great work of modem 
political theory, mostly for the way it decoupled morality from action. 
Indeed, it can be said that Machiavelli stood Aristotelian virtue ethics on 
26. ETHICS 2000, supra note 21, at xii. 
27. RESTATE~fE:\, (THIRD) OFTHE L"w GOVER"I"G L"WYERS (2000). 
28. See, e.g., QUE:\,IN SKIi\'"ER, MACHI." VEW (1981); HARVEY C. MA:'\SFIELD, MACHI." VEU..I'S 
VIRTUE (1966); I\IACRIZIO VIROU, NICCOLO'S SMILE (2000); LEo STRAUSS, THOUGHTS 0" 
MACHI." VEW (1958). 
29. Recent useful editions include: NICCOLO MACHIAVEW, THE PRI"CE (Angelo M. Codevil\a 
trans., 1997); NICCOLO MACHIAVELU, THE PRI"CE (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., 1998); NICCOLO 
MACHI." VELU, THE PRINCE (Robert M. Adams trans., 1992). 
30. MACHIAVEW, MARKETI:-IG AND MA:-IAGEME;Io, (Phil Harris et al. eds., 2000); A',HO"YJAY, 
MA:'\AGDIE:\, A:,\D MACHIAVEW (1994); MICHAEL ARTHCR LEDEE:,\, MACHIAVELU 0:'\ MODER:'\ 
LEADERSHIP: WHY MACHIAVEW'S IRO" RULES ARE AS TI~IELY A:-ID hfPORTAlI.' TODAY AS FIVE 
CE"TCRIES AGO (2000); AUSTAIR MCALPI:-IE, THE NEW MACHIAVEW: THE ART OF POUTICS IN 
BCSI:'\ESS (1998); HARRIET RCBI:-I, THE PRINCESSA: MACHI." "ELLI FOR WmlE" (1998). 
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its head and redefined the term.31 Again, the simple and stark theme of 
The Prince is that a successful prince was defined by how effectively he 
could acquire and maintain power. Not so different from a lawyer 
building a practice in a competitive world. Machiavelli's redefinition of 
virtue makes the Socratic question: "How should I live the good life?" 
subordinate or irrelevant to power politics just as the question "Can a 
good lawyer be a good person?" has become irrelevant for ethics 
codes.32 Indeed, according to The Prince, goodness can only be used in 
service of power, it has no value on its own. Similarly, ethics codes are 
about keeping your license rather than improving your soul. 
Machiavelli's central claim aboutthe behavior of princes echoes the 
basic tension that divides ethics and professionalism into a set of formal 
rules for behavior and discipline and into a separate set of aspirational 
standards. Former Harvard law professor and jurisprude, Lon Fuller, 
called this divide between ethics and professionalism a divide between 
the "morality of duty" and the "morality of aspiration.,,33 
Similarly to The Prince, the discussion of the moral or amoral nature 
oflawyer behavior is analogous to Holmes's bad man. ·Holmes is often 
wrongly quoted on this point. In The Path of the lAw34 Holmes wrote that 
to study law, and here we would say its ethics codes, one is best served by 
doing so as a bad man to understand its limits before suffering its 
penalties, even while acknowledging that the "law is the witness and 
external deposit of our morallife.,,35 
The Prince provides a departure point to discuss the ethical and moral 
obligations of being a lawyer. For those lawyers who find solace in 
minima, again like Holmes's bad man, legal ethics rules are to be read 
narrowly and taken right up to the limit. For lawyers who believe that 
the profession embodies a broader sense of responsibility and justice, a 
discussion of professionalism provides some guidance. 
II. PROFESSIONALISM 
Many legal professionals believe that disciplinary codes do not go far 
enough, particularly if we are to improve public trust in the profession 
and reverse growing dissatisfaction among lawyers. While the history 
31. See, e.g., QL'E:'o.'TIN SKINNER, MACHIAVEU..I \'i (1981). ("And I ha\'e held to my belief that 
l\lachiavelli's pivotal concept oft'irtU (t'ir/US in Latin) cannot be translated into modern English by any single 
1I'0rd or manageable series of periphrases. "). 
32. See THE GOOD LAWYER: L<\WYERS' ROLES AND L.<\\WERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1984); 
DAVID LL'BAN, L<\\\'YERS ANDjVSTICE: AN ETHICAL STL'DY (1988). 
33. LoN L FL'I.LER, THE I\IORAUTYOF L.o\\\' 4 (2d ed. 1969). 
34. Olh'cr Wendell Holmes, Tht Path tifthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
35. /d. at 459. 
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of legal ethics codes is instructive, presenting as it does the tension 
between discipline and aspiration, it is less instructive on how to 
navigate that tension. Instead, the path from minimum rules to 
aspirational goals requires other guides, and the current guide of choice 
is the concept of professionalism. 
A. Introduction 
Although professionalism has captured the attention of the legal 
profession from law schools to state supreme courts, it is a mistake to 
equate it with legal ethics. Here we take the view that professionalism 
is a broad concept, encompassing the lawyer's obligation not only to 
adhere to disciplinary rules, but also to undertake the lifelong challenges 
of maintaining competence, acting with integrity, serving the public, and 
seeking justice. Because these four challenges should become a 
significant part of a lawyer's life, that part should begin to be developed 
in law school. 
Thinking about professionalism in the context onegal education, and 
particularly new student Qrientation,36 offers several advantages. First, 
new law students bring few preconceptions to what experienced 
attorneys may regard as the overworked notion of "professionalism.,,37 
U njaded, they can think freshly and even idealistically about the concept 
of professionalism. Presenters, whether legal educators or practitioners, 
offered this tabula rasa, have a rare opportunity to think creatively about 
first principles of professionalism and what might be said on the first day 
of law school to instill the commitments undertaken by beginning the 
study of law. Second, such beginning instruction forms the essential 
foundation for more complex notions of professional responsibility that 
will carry over into the students' careers. To borrow a concept from a 
36. Several states have initiated p'rogramson professionalism for law students. For example, the Chief 
Justice's Commission on Professionalism in Georgia has adopted an extensive program, mounted at all 
Georgia law schools by attorney volunteers, who are specially trained'to work in two hour program segments 
with material developed to guide new law students in professionalism considerations. Each program begins 
with an address by ajustice of the Georgia Supreme Coun and is followed by attorney-led breakout sections 
where students discuss hypothetical problems about ethics and professionalism which might arise in law 
school or in practice. CHIEF JUSTICE'S CO~I~USSION Olli PROFESSIOlliAUSM, TEACHIlI:GPROFESSIOlliAUSM 
Illi GEORGIA 7. 
37. The inclusion of the professionalism CLE requirements for lawyers has been met with skepticism 
in some quaners. Repetitive programs emphasizing the same "Lawyers Creed" have harmed the 
professionalism movement more than helped it. CHIEF JUSTICE'S CO~BlISSION Oll: PROFESSIONAUS~I, 
THE WORKI1\'G GROUP OF LAWYER C01\'DUCT }\1\'D PROFESSIOlliAUS~I, A NATIOlliAL ACTIOIIi Pl.""" ON 
L>\WYER C01\'DUCT AND PROFESSI01\'AUS~1 15 (1999). Recent eITons to address professionalism issues in 
the context of particular substantive practice areas have been more successful. Guidelines for Professionalism 
CLE programs have been issued in Georgia, Ohio, and several other states. 
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1992 ABA task force report,38 legal education, and by extension 
professionalism education, occurs along a continuum. Finally, introduc-
ing students to professionalism from their first day of law school lends 
symbolic import to that moment in their professional character 
development. 
Even with these advantages, professionalism as a dimension of a 
lawyer'S ethos presents real educational problems, largely because our 
considerations of what professionalism means have too often been 
considerations of superficial symptoms combined with quick fix cures. 
B. Superficial Symptoms and Qyick Fix Cures 
Civility 
Arriving at the four broad challenges for professionalism education 
started with the conviction that concern about the unbecoming conduct 
of lawyers had limited rather than informed our understanding of 
professionalism. The conflation of professionalism with civility is the 
primary example of this limitation. While civility may be the result of 
true professionalism, it is not co-extensive with it. The following are a 
few examples of how we have tended to equate civility and professional-
Ism. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio's concern for professionalism grew out 
of an observation that instances of unprofessional conduct were 
increasing in frequency and severity.39 The Court's response was to 
designate a committee to study existing creeds of professionalism. 40 The 
work of this committee ultimately led to the formation of the Supreme 
Court Commission on Professionalism in 1992, and the adoption in 
1997 of the Statement on Prqfessionalism, A lAwyer's Creed, and A lAwyer's 
Aspirational Ideals. In particular, A lAwyer's Creed addresses professional-
ism as a matter of conducting ourselves civilly vis-a.-vis others involved 
in the legal system. 
In 1998, the Columbus Bar Association developed one of the first 
programs of the organized bar to address problems of civility. The 
38. ABA SEC. 0" LEGAL Em;c. & AmllSSIONS TO THE BAR, TASK FORCE ON L .. ,,· SCHOOL.'> AND 
THE PROFESSIO:-\; NARRO\\'I:-\G THE GAP LEGAL EDtJCATIO:-\ AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOP~lE:-\T-A:-\ 
Em':CATIOXAL CO:\TIXL'DI 140 (1992) (hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. See infta notes 79-80. 
39. Report of the Supreme Court Committee to Study Creeds of Professionalism 3 (December 1990) 
(on file with author). 
40. A 1998 count by the ABA totaled 106 examples of codes from courts, national, state and local 
bar associations, and state professionalism commissions. ABA, PRO~IOTI;\,G PROFESSIO"AUS~I; ABA 
PROGR:\~IS, PLO\XS, A;\'D STRATEGIES 53 (1998) (hereinafter PRmlOTING PROFESSIO;\,AUS\I]. 
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Civility Enhancement Program enables lawyers to lodge complaints with 
the bar association, which may lead to efforts at conciliation. An express 
goal of the program is to "promote and influence the attainment of an 
enhanced standard of professionalism. ,,41 
In August 2001, the Cincinnati Bar Association adopted the report of 
the Civility Task Force, a part of which is a recommended Attorney 
Code of Conduct.42 A feature of the code is that members of the legal 
community can pledge to promote professionalism and civility by calling 
to have their names added to the list of endorsing attorneys. In all three 
of these laudable efforts, professionalism and civility are presented as 
virtually co-extensive. Or if not co-extensive, then civility is at least 
presented as topic one under the heading "professionalism." 
That civility leads the list of professionalism concerns is no surprise. 
It is an obvious problem; it can make the practice oflaw unpleasant for 
many lawyers; and it can be defined in behavioral, and therefore more 
concrete, terms. We know civility (or incivility) when we see it. 
Civility creeds and codes are not without their criticS.43 Critics argue 
that the civility movement, including CLE programs, focuses too much 
on "making lawyers feel better about themselves," and on making the 
public think more favorably of the profession rather than addressing 
underlying problems of lawyer behavior.44 Civility, it has been 
suggested, is understood by some to be a "bumper sticker slogan, as in, 
'have you hugged your adversary today.",45 It has also been suggested 
that civility is a problem only in large law firm practices or in litigation 
settings. Civility codes are criticized because "[t] hose lawyers who don't 
need codes observe them, and those who do, don't."46 
Yet, we are less willing to dismiss such efforts.47 Rather, we believe 
that civility initiatives are important, but recognize with Roger Cramton 
of Cornell that" [c] ivility is not the core of the enterprise. It is like an 
41. THE COLDlBCS BAR Ass':\", C(VIUTY PROGRA~(, at http:www.cbalaw.org(last visitedJan. 18, 
2003). 
42. CI:\"CJ:\":\"ATI BAR Ass':\" CJVIUTY TASK FORCE, CHARACTER COC:\TS: Foccs O:\" 
PROFESSJO:\":\US~I A:\"D CJVIUTY J:\" THE Lo\\\" (200 I) [hereinafter CHARACTER COC:\TS]. 
43. Thomas A. Gottschalk, CU'iJi!y COtlts: Treating the Symptom .Yot tM Disease, 1996 THE PROF. Lo\\\". 
37. 
44. /d. 
45. Louis H. Pollak, Pn!ftssiOTUlIAttitudt, 84-ACG. A.B.A.J. 66 (1998) (quoting United States Supreme 
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy). Justice Kennedy is critical of this superficial view of ci,·ility. He states, 
"Civility is the mark of an accomplished and superb professional, but it is even more than this. It is an end 
in itself." /d. 
46. PRO~JOTI:\"G PROFESSJO:\"AUS~f, supm note 40, at 55. 
47. See CHARACTER COC:\TS, supra note 42, for an excellent statement and practical list of 
aspirational goals. 
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elegant dessert, which dresses up and completes a good meal. The 
nourishment," Cramton suggests, "lies elsewhere."48 
Taking professionalism to mean civil behavior has focused our 
attention too much on superficial conduct and too little on broader 
themes. To make civil behavior understood as an important aspect of 
professionalism, it must be presented as the logical manifestation of 
embracing a professional's value system. 
Competition and Commercialization 
A second limitation on our understanding of the broad concept of 
professionalism is our nostalgia for earlier times when practicing law was 
"more a profession than a business." These memories are usually 
accompanied by stories of clients who paid, without question, sizable un-
itemized bills "for professional services rendered." 
The character of this older form of law practice was collegial: a 
fellowship, with some masters and some beginners, practicing a 
historically rooted public craft founded upon an established body of 
knowledge believed to be ennobling. Today's commercialized model 
oflaw practice is not collegial in spirit. Nor is it even political, except 
in the narrow sense implying contentiousness of conflicting desires. It 
is corporate in form, competitive in character, and all too often 
avaricious in aims.49 
Numerous factors are to blame for the perceived increasing commer-
cialism of law practice . .}o Firms have gotten larger; lawyers have 
multiple employment tracks; cases have gotten more complicated; 
salaries have gone through roofs;51 mentoring is a memory; loyalty is 
a thing of the past; and marketing and public relations (not to mention 
advertising?2 are matters of day-to-day lawyering.53 This description, 
however, tells only half the picture. There are more women and 
48. ROGER C. CRA~ITO:X, ABA SEC. 0:\ LEGAl. EDl:C. & AmIlSSIO:X TO THI; BAR o:x GIH:XG 
I\(EA:XI:XG TO "PROFESSIO:XAUS~I" 7, 14 (1996). 
49. William T. Braithwaite, Hearts and Minds: Can Ptuftsswnnlism Be Taught?, 76-SEP. A.B.A.J. 70, 70 
(1990). 
50. Ste generally Terry Carter, Law at 1M C,.ossroads, 88·;}.<\:X. A.B.A.J. 29 (2002). 
51. Ste, e.g., http://www.greedyassociates.com/(Iast visited Jan. 18,2003). 
52. Lawyer advertising has occasionally been a worry. Take the infamous Rosalie Osias, of Greal 
Neck, New York, whose ads have been described as follows: "A woman itl a black leather miniskirt crouches 
seductively over a motorcycle, vowing her company will 'ride anything' to accommodate a client's deadlines. 
In another pose, the woman is draped across a desk, her heels kicked up behind her as she seductively biles 
a pencil and intimates that her firm 'has a reputation ..... According to I\[s. Osias, "Sex sells. It sells 
everything ill our society, why not legal services?" Di I\lari Ricker, 'Ad'.,rausrum: Has u'll!YtI' Ad"tI'lising Run 
Amok?, 26 STl':DE:>.T LA\\,. 19 (1998). Seriously, don't these cases mke care of themselves? 
53. Ste supm note 20. 
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minorities in the profession; employment tracks are more flexible; new 
areas of practice are opening, particularly related to technology; new 
skills, largely entrepreneurial, are required; and the practice oflaw has 
become less clubby and more democratic. 
In short, it would be mistaken to blame economic forces leading to 
the infusion of business and commercial concepts and attitudes into the 
practice oflaw as the bane of professionalism. It is more likely the case 
that lawyers and firms need to become more business-like to become 
more professional. They must concentrate on adding value to client 
matters and investing and developing human capital as examples of 
positive lessons learne~ from business. 54 
The Supreme Court of Ohio targeted competition as a cause of the 
profession's troubles, suggesting this genesis in its 1997 Statement on 
Professionalism. The Court said, "[T]rends ... developing among 
lawyers in Ohio and elsewhere which emphasize commercialism in the 
practice oflaw,,53 Were, along with incivility, reasons for the creation of 
the Commission on Professionalism. Yet, good business practices are 
client or customer-centered and have much to teach lawyers about what 
is valuable in law practice. 56 
Eliminating, or even diminishing, the commercial aspect of practicing 
law does not pave the path to ptofessionalism. The concept of profes-
sionalism that takes the "American virtues of risk-taking, private 
initiative, and competitive markets as vices in the practice oflaw ... is 
inconsistent with both history and reality.,,57 The entrepreneurial 
character of the practice oflaw has more often been a source of strength 
than of weakness. Moreover, in the face of competitive issues like multi-
disciplinary practice and multi jurisdictional practice, lawyers must be 
both entrepreneurial and professional to survive. What lawyers must 
learn is that respect and care for clients, colleagues, staff, and even 
adversaries are best practices in both business and the profession. 
Eliminating the entrepreneurial character of practicing law is not only 
impossible but also undesirable, and avoiding the commercialism 
typified by lawyer advertising is neither practical nor helpful in 
understanding the essence of professionalism. Like civility, dignified 
advertising, while perhaps desirable, should not be an end in itself but 
54. See,e.g., DA\"lDH.l\I.O\ISTER, TRl:EPROFESSIO:-:ALIS~I: THECOl:RAGETOCAREABOLTYOl:R 
PEOPLE, YOl:R CLIE:\TS, A:-:D YOl:R CAREER (1997); STEVEX KEEVA, TRA:-:SFOR~II:-:G PRACTICES: 
FIxDI:-:GJOY AXD SATISFAGfIO:-: 1:-: THE LEGAL LIFE (1999); l\IIHALY CSIKSZE:\T~IIHALY & WIWA~I 
DA~IOX, GOOD WORK: WHE:-: EXCELLEXCE AXD ETHICS !\IEET (200 I). 
55. Statement on Professionalism Issued by the Supreme Court of Ohio (February 3, 1997). 
56. &e, e.g., l\IAISTER, supra note 54; KEEVA, supra note 54. 
57. CRA~ITOX, supra note 48, at 15. 
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should result from a commitment to some more fundamental set of 
values. 
Bridge-the-Gap Programs 
A customary fix for professionalism concerns has been correcting 
behaviors and attitudes of new lawyers, leading to initiatives that address 
professionalism more comprehensively in law school. This approach 
assumes a consensus exists about what to teach, but that law schools are 
not teaching it soon enough. As educators, we take this criticism with 
no small amount of skepticism. Law schools playa very important role 
in the professional education and training of lawyers, but student 
readiness for professionalism instruction may be limited by the demands 
of substantive course work and the absence of the client context. 
Readiness quickly occurs once a law school graduate takes the oath and 
begins representing real clients. This experience can be duplicated to 
some degree in law school through clinical and internship experiences, 
or even in some summer clerkships. But when the personal conse-
quences are, at worst, a bad grade, the motivation is not the same as 
when the admitted lawyer takes responsibility for the legal affairs of 
another. 
Bridge-the-Gap programs for new admittees are preferred by the 
Supreme Court of Ohio. The Court has recently adopted a New 
Lawyers Training obligation, required for the first time of those who 
passed theJuly 2001 bar. It consists of twelve hours covering specific 
subjects, and must be completed before the end of the year following 
admission. The rule requires six hours of instruction on topics related 
to the professional relationships and obligations oflawyers.58 Skepticism 
is warranted here, even though both authors were involved in the study 
and adoption of Ohio's Bridge-the-Gap rules. Students must learn the 
nuts-and-bolts, and such programs can start that process. To a lesser 
extent, Bridge-the-Gap programs can continue the development of 
professionalism started in law school, but it cannot substitute for 
continued education in the profession. 
Mentoring 
Better mentoring of new lawyers has also been suggested as a quick 
fix to professionalism problems. Structured mentoring programs, in 
which mentors are assigned to junior lawyers, appeal to many because 
58. St.:P. CT. RVLES FOR THE GOV'T OF OHIO X, Regulation 414(D)(4). 
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senior lawyers, under numerous pressures, no longer devote time to 
coaching and teaching new lawyers as they once used to do, informally, 
as a matter of course. At first impression, assigning experienced 
attorneys to nurture and train new attorneys makes common sense. 
Though an excellent idea in theory, with respected antecedents, today, 
assigned mentoring rarely works. The competitive pressures on practice 
catalogued above do take their toll here. Simply, senior lawyers find 
themselves too busy to mentor junior lawyers on a sustained basis. 
Evidence also suggests that women receive less mentoring than men,j9 
although both suffer. 
Even though mentoring programs are difficult to implement and 
sustain, they may nevertheless be worth trying, as mentoring can work 
if certain conditions are present. First, mentoring works best when the 
program is small and local, giving the mentor and the new lawyer an 
opportunity to be in regular proximity. Second, mentoring requires 
some affinity between the mentor and the new lawyer, or at least a belief 
that each will be a credit to the other. In too many mentoring pro-
grams, mentors and mentees are assigned, giving too little attention to 
either of these factors, or to a third important one, that the senior lawyer 
and the new lawyer have enough in common so that they can talk easily 
about subjects other than the practice oflaw. Third, the contacts must 
be sustained over a long enough period of time for coaching lessons to 
be effective. Finally, difficulties inherent in administering a program 
must be addressed and overcome. Questions likely to arise for the 
program administrator include who qualifies as a mentor, who decides 
which mentor is assigned to which new lawyer, what are the expecta-
tions on each side of the relationship, and what happens if those 
expectations are not met.60 
Because of difficulties in creating and maintaining necessary struc-
tures, mentoring programs are not the panacea they might at first 
appear to be. Attorneys who enjoy mentoring should be encouraged to 
continue to assist new lawyers in making the transition into the practice 
oflaw, but reliance on assigned mentors will not solve our professional-
ism problems. 
Attention to civility, undignified commercialization, new lawyer 
training, and mentoring has enabled us to make progress toward 
professionalism, and in fact these represent important initiatives and 
59. C.HHU:'\ DO:,\:,\ELL ET AL., COLO. WmlE:,\'s BAR. Ass':,\, GE:'\OER PE:'\ALTIE.'>; THE RE.'>U.TS 
OFTHE CAREERS .. \:'\0 CmfPE:'\SATIO:'\ Sn:OY 51-57 (1998). 
60. For an excellent description of problems and practical solutions for mentoring programs, see 
LI:\"OA PHILLIPS-JO:'\ES, ABA SECTIO:'\ OF LITIGATIO:\" A:\":'\t:AL FALL 1\1EETI:\"G CO~I~IO:\" PROBLE~IS 1:,\ 
PL.o\1\:,\ED ME:\TORI:,\G PROGR .. \~fS (1992) (on file with author). 
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discussions. Other undertakings might be mentioned here as well, such 
as fulfilling pro bono obligations, which is a strong theme of the ABA. 61 
Still, if professionalism is going to guide us to the aspirational goals 
missing from black letter disciplinary codes, we must delve deeper to 
. find a statement of the first values of the profession. 
C. The First Values of Professionalism 
Standard definitions of professionalism offer a place to start. One 
favored definition was coined mid-century by Harvard Dean Roscoe 
Pound, who said: 
the term refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common 
calling in the spirit of public service-no less a public service because 
it may incidentally be a means oflivelihood. Pursuit of the learned art 
in the spirit of public service is the primary purpose.ti2 
The Pound definition was recently updated and re-published in an 
ABA publication, Teaching and Learning Professionalism, the 1996 report of 
the Professionalism Committee of the American Bar Association Section 
on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar.63 Its authors adopted 
Pound's approach, suggesting that the core of professionalism is public 
service. The Report updated and expanded the definition, as follows: 
A professional lawyer is an expert in law pursuing a learned art in 
service to clients and in the spirit of public service, and engaging in 
these pursuits as part of a common calling to promote justice and 
public good.64 
The Report goes on to list the "essential characteristics of the 
professional lawyer," which are: (1) learned knowledge, (2) skill in 
applying the applicable law to the factual context, (3) thoroughness of 
preparation, (4) practical and prudential wisdom, (5) ethical conduct and 
integrity, and (6) dedication to justice and the public good.65 The 
definition section ofthe report ends by noting that the "values underly-
ing lawyer professionalism are aspirational in nature, unlike the 
minimum standard" ofthe "ethical disciplinary rules.,,66 
61. PRO~IOTI:\G PROFF."SIO:\AUS~I, supra note 40, at 75. 
62. ROSCOE POl;:\D, THE l."\\'YER FRml A:\T1Qt:lTY TO l\IODER:\ TI~IF." 5 (1953). 
63. ABA SEC. 0:\ LEGAL Em;c. & AmIlSSIO:\S TO THE BAR, REP. OF THE PROFF."SIO:\AUS~I 
Cml~IITrEE, TEACHI:\G A:\D LEAR:\I:\G PROFF."SIO:\AIJS~1 (1995) [hereinafter TEACHI:XG & LEARXI:\G 
PROFF."SIO:\AUS~IJ. 
64. /d. at 6. 
65. /d. at 6-7. 
66. /d. at 10. 
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Professor Roger Cramton, in an exceptionally thoughtful essay,67 
called for a reaffirmation of the central moral tradition of lawyering, 
which he says is fully described in a 1958 ABA joint report on the 
professional responsibilities of lawyers, authored primarily by Lon 
Fuller.68 In Fuller's words, the lawyer's primary obligation is to the 
"procedures and institutions of the law.,,69 Moreover, he continues, the 
role of the lawyer within the legal system "imposes a trusteeship for the 
integrity of those fundamental processes of government and self-
government upon which the successful functioning of our society 
depends.,,70 
Cramton suggests that the problem today is the professional ideology 
that requires total commitment to clients .. He says, "[I]f 'client comes 
first' meant only that the client's interest is superior to that of the lawyer, 
it would be sound and praiseworthy. But the dominant view often 
means that only client interests are respected, not those of courts, third 
persons, and the public.,,71 
He cites a number of reports that suggest that legal services today are 
"market driven, with lawyers serving as expert technicians and hired 
guns who view their work as a task-oriented coinmodity."n Cramton 
speaks critically and notes the great symbolic importance of the ABA's 
resistance to imposing upon lawyers a duty to disclose client confidences 
when necessary to prevent or rectify client fraud where the lawyer's 
services were used.73 
The Fuller report discussed the difficulty of bringing home to the law 
student, the lawyer, and the public an understanding of the nature of the 
lawyer's professional· responsibilities.74 In the report, Fuller describes 
how private practice can be a fomi of public service, saying "private 
practice is a form of public service when it is conducted with an 
appreciation of, and a respect for, the larger framework of government 
of which it forms a part, including under the term government . 
voluntary forms of self-regulation.1l75 
67. CR.'\~ITO:'\, supra note 48, at 20. 
68. Lon L. Fuller &John D. Randall, PrqftssWnaI Responsihilily: Report riftheJoint Corifefence, 44 A.B.A. 
J. 1159 (1958). 
69. /d. at 162. 
70. /d. 
71. CR.'\~ITO:'\, supra note 48, lit 19. 
72. /d. 
73. ABA discussions of revisions to Rule 1.6(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are the 
most recent example of Cramton's point. See I\Iark Hansen, Model Ruks Rehab: House Tackks Tough issues as 
f.lhics Dtbate Begins, 87·Qcr. A.B.A.J. 80 (2001) .. 
74. Fuller & Randall, supra note 68, at 1162. 
75. /d. By \'olunmry forms of self.regulation, Fulkr refe ... to those instances where parties set terms 
under which they will come together to collabordte and to arrange their relationships: by forming 
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Justice O'Connor's oft-quoted assessment of professionalism IS 
similar, more recent, and noteworthy: 
To me, the essence of professionalism is a commitment to develop 
one's skills and to apply [them] responsibly to the problems at hand. 
Professionalism requires adherence to the highest ethical standards of 
conduct, and a willingness to subordinate narrow self interest in 
pursuit of the more fundamental goal of public service. 
She continues: 
Because of the tremendous power they wield in our system, lawyers 
must never forget that their duty to serve their clients fairly and 
skillfully takes priority over the personal accumulation of wealth. At 
the same time, lawyers must temper bold advocacy for their clients 
with a sense of responsibility to the larger legal system which strives, 
however imperfectly, to provide justice for all.76 
Justice O'Connor's articulation, to a great degree, synthesizes and 
simplifies the other definitions and aptly strikes four broad aspirational 
themes: developing skills, adhering to ethical standards, serving clients 
and the public, and taking responsibility to provide justice for all. These 
challenges, basic and easily remembered, can serve as the right 
foundational guides for law students, and form a broad foundation for 
professionalism activities considered by bar associations and state 
supreme courts. 77 
D. Four Challenges oj Prqfissionalism 
Skills Competence 
Achieving and maintaining competence in a wide range of analytical 
and operational skills lies at the core of professionalism. The challenge 
is to understand that achieving and maintaining competence is not 
separate from professionalism, but one of its first principles. To 
embrace the notion that competence is more than technical skills is 
corporations, partnerships, labor unions, clubs, and churches; by entering contracts and leases, and by 
engaging in other large and small transactions through which their rights and duties toward one another arc 
defined. /d. "Within this larger framework the lawyer must seek the answer to what he must do, the limits 
of what he must do." /d. He goes on to say that "partisan advocacy is a form of public service so long as it 
aids the process of adjudication; it ceases to be when it hinders that process, when it misleads, distorts and 
obfuscates, when it renders the task of the deciding tribunal not easier but more difficult." /d. 
76. COt;RT OF ApPEAL..., OF l\ID., PROFESSIO;\"AUS~I COL"RSE FOR NEW AD~lrn·EES TO THE MD. 
BAR, PROFF~'lSI01\AUS~I: ABOVE A;\"D BEYO:\D ETHICS (1992) (on file with author). 
77. C01\F. Qt' CHIEF JL"STICES, NATI01\AL ACTIO;\" PI_<\:\ Ol' L.<\WYER COl'DL"CT Al'D 
PROFESSIO;\"AUS~I (1999). 
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likewise critical. Meeting this challenge means not only mastering a 
certain body of substantive knowledge and a set of lawyering skills, but 
also applying them both with independent judgment and practical 
wisdom.78 
The 1992 Report on Law Schools and the Prqftssion,79 known as the 
MacCrate Report after its primary author, Robert MacC rate ,80 
identifies as the first fundamental value of the profession, "the Provision 
of Competent Representation.,,81 The ABA's Standing Committee on 
Lawyer Competence captured this challenge well when it emphasized 
that, "Law is a craft that endeavors to shape its work with balance and 
precision, that rejects imperfection and flaw, that values dispassionate 
analysis, that is conscious and sensitive, and that understands that one 
apt word or phrase can clarify an issue, or convert contention into 
consensus. ,,82 Understanding law is a craft that elicits pride and 
responsibility. This tradition gives competence a special meaning and 
emphasizes it as a crucial element of professionalism. 
Integrity 
The second challenge calls for lawyers to act with integrity, or what 
Justice O'Connor refers to as the highest ethical standards. Many 
people think of professionalism exclusively as a higher form of ethics, 
calling for us to do what the Code of Professional Responsibility 
requires, and then to do it with respect for the relationships lawyers must 
maintain with the others who inhabit the legal system. The Ohio 
Lawyer's Creed, written in terms of the character of the relationships we 
have with judges, lawyers, our colleagues in our firms, our clients, and 
finally with the public at large, seems to take this view.83 
78. Jerome]. Shestack, Taking Prl!fessionalism Serious{y, 84-AUG. A.B.A.]. 73 (1998). 
79. 1\1ACCRATE REPORT, supra note 38. The MACCRATEREPORTisa thorollgh and comprehensive 
study listing ten fundamental skills and four values of the legal professional. The Report explains each of 
these in great detail and is recommended to you for your reading. For our purposes, we have reduced the 
se\'eral skills and \'alues of the MACCRATE REPORT into four challenges of professionalism. The 
fundamental skills are: Problem Solving; Legal Analysis and Reasoning; Legal Research; Factual 
Investigation; Communication; Counseling; Negotiation; Litigation and Alternate Dispute Resolution; 
Organization and Management of Legal Work; and, Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas. The 
fundamental \'alues are: Provision of Competent Reputation; Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness and 
Morality; Striving to Improve the Profession; and, Professional Self-De\,elopment. 
80. Robert MacCrate is senior counsel with Sullivan & Cromwell; he is a past president of the ABA, 
and the State Bar of New York. 
81. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 207. 
82. PRO~IOTING PROFESSIONALIS~I, supra note 40, at 43. 
83. SUP. CT. OHIO, A LAWYER'S CREED (1997). 
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Although the ethical integrity of the lawyer must be the profession's 
first commitment, the ethics rules of today are primarily a set of 
behavioral rules. "Acting with integrity" is the phrase which seems to 
capture better the idea of a value system, a mind-set, a responsibility 
that should remain constantly in the lawyer's consciousness8 as well as 
the idea of acting accordingly.8s Just as competence is more than a set 
of technical skills, acting with integrity is more fundamental than simply 
staying out of trouble with the grievance committee. 
Service 
Meeting the challenge of integrity in the profession lies largely in re-
affirming the central moral tradition of lawyering.86 That tradition 
asserts that the lawyer's primary obligation is, in Fuller's words quoted 
earlier, to the "procedures and institutions of the law,,,87 which leads to 
the third challenge, making a commitment to a life of service. 
If service to others is the central commitment of a lawyer's profes-
sional life, then the challenge of this aspect of professionalism is to 
understand service in a more complex way than volunteering in 
community organizations or doing pro bono work. These are important 
undertakings, but the more complicated challenge is to reconsider and 
re-embrace the understanding of client service as taking place within the 
tradition of service to the public.88 In the words of Professor Cramton, 
Representation of private clients serves public goals ... when lawyer 
professionalism [1] encourages lawyers to assist clients in refining their 
objectives in the light of moral concerns, [2] channels client conduct 
in law-abiding paths, and [3] subordinates the interests of clients in 
those less common situations in which a client's wrongful conduct 
threatens serious injury to third persons or to the integrity of judicial 
process.89 
Justice O'Connor likewise calls for the subordination of narrow self 
interest to the more fundamental goal of public service. 
84. PROMOTING PROFESSIONi\USM, supra note 40, at 9. 
85. See supra Part I. Several commentators have noted the transition in this century from the 1908 
Canons of Ethics, which werc aspirational in nature, to thc Model Rules, adopted in 1983 by the ABA, 
which set forth black leller rules for ethical beha\'ior. The l\-Iodel Rules have come to be regarded, not as 
minimum standards beyond which all lawyers should strivc, but as the maximum standards of ethical 
beha\'ior, in other words, not a floor, but a ceiling. 
86. CRi\MTON, supra note 48, at 18·19. 
87. Fuller & Randall, supra note 68, at 1162. 
88. PoUND, supra note 62, at 9·10. 
89. CRi\MTON,.l'Upranote48,at 16·17. 
HeinOnline -- 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 607 2002-2003
2002] BETWEEN LA WAND VIRTUE 607 
Recent writings on professionalism have begun to address with 
greater emphasis the problem of "hired gun" advocacy.90 According to 
Russell Pearce, Director of Fordham's Center for Law and Ethics, 
"Persuading today's elite lawyers of an obligation to the public good 
requires a new understanding, with two objectives. First, commitment 
to the public good must be reconciled with the acknowledgment that law 
is a business. Second, the hired gun's principle of moral non-account-
ability must end.,,91 
To achieve the goal of service to private clients as a form of public 
service, attorneys must more strongly reclaim the independence of 
judgment for which our services are sought. Jerome Shestack, President 
of the ABA in 1997-1998, for whom Professionalism was the theme of 
his presidential year, notes that today, too many lawyers, acting out of 
enthusiasm to gain and keep their clients, "are willing to forego their 
independent judgment and adherence to professional values to do 
whatever the client asks." For these lawyers, the desire for economic 
gain and the culture of the marketplace have been allowed to override 
independent judgment. 92 
The challenge, then, in making a commitment to practice law in 
service to one's clients and the public good is in finding the proper 
balance between zealous advocacy on the one hand, and independent 
judgment and moral accountability on the other. 
SeekingJ ustice 
The fourth and final challenge of professionalism is seekingjustice for 
all as a priority of our legal institutions. This challenge may be divided 
into two parts: Part one is assuring the quality onegal representation for 
those unable to afford it. The challenge associated with the distribution 
oflegal services remains unsolved partly because there is no agreement, 
except at the rhetorical level, about what the problems are.93 
In her recent book, In the Interests qfJustice: Riforming the Legal Prqfession, 
Deborah Rhode of Stanford University asserts that the public is 
90. See, e.g., Scott Smith, Troth and Justice on the Scqlfold: A Critique c!f"Hired Gun" Adt'Octuy, 62 TE."\:. BJ. 
1096 (\999); Russell G. Pearce, Retreat c!fthe Elite, 23 AMER. L>\w. 79 (2001). 
91. Pearce, supra note 90. The first step will be distinguishing loyalty to the client from hired gun 
advocacy. One quality the public highly values is that lawyers are faithful in protecting the interests of their 
clients. At the same time, the quality the public identifies as the least desirable is the lawyer's perceived 
willingness to bend the rule to the point of breaking (or further) to serve a client's interests. "People hate a 
hired gun until they need one of their own." DEBORAH L RHODE, IN THE Jl\'TERESTS OF JUSTICE: 
REFOR~IING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7 (2000). 
92. Shestack, supra note 78, at 73. 
93. RHODE, supra note 91, at 17. 
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ambivalent about the connection between money and justice. Ameri-
cans dislike the idea that law is accessible only to the wealthy, but our 
social policies in recent years have not provided a remedy to the 
problem of legal services for the poor, much less those of moderate 
income.94 The MacCrate Report, referred to earlier, identifies an 
obligation to provide pro bono service as one off our fundamental values 
of the profession,95 but surveys indicate that the average annual pro 
bono contribution for lawyers is less than eighty-five dollars.96 
One development which may seem counter-intuitive on the issue of 
legal services for the public is the growth of public interest law. When 
the Office of Equal Opportunity Legal Services Program was created in 
1965,97 meeting the legal needs of the poor was determined to be the 
responsibility, not of the bar at large, but of a smaller group of dedicated 
public interest lawyers who, out of that dedication, were willing to take 
lower salaries to ensure that the law might be available to those without 
funds to pay. The emergence of public interest law as a specialty of 
practice has enabled the legal profession to place the burden of meeting 
the professionalism challenge of seeking justice for all on the shoulders 
of a few lawyers. As economic pressures on private firm lawyers have 
increased, this has been a convenient shift. 
The development of public interest practice has greatly benefited 
society, and the attorneys who contribute their pro bono hours are to be 
commended and recognized. However, the limitations on the type of 
work public interest lawyers can do and the threatened de-funding of 
LSC in 1981, suggest that the professionalism challenge of ')ustice for 
all" is one we ought not in good conscience leave to one segment of the 
bar or assume is resolved. 
The second part of the challenge of seeking justice is the openness of 
the profession to diversity. In the words of a recent ABA publication, 
"A system beset by bias, whether racial, gender, ethnic or in other 
forms, cannot render equal justice.,,98 To further the end of equal 
justice, one of the most serious challenges of professionalism must be to 
seek the full and equal participation of minorities and women in the 
profession.99 
94. /d. at 7; PRoMOTl:-.'G PROFESSIO:-.'AUSM, supra nOle 40, at 63·64. 
95. l\-IACCRATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 214. 
96. RHODE, supra note 91, at 5. 
97. DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 736 (200 I). 
98. PRO~10TlNG PROFESSIONAUSM, supra note 40, lit 62. 
99. /d. Ironically, diversity in the profession is sometimes named as part of the reason for a decline 
of professionalism. Under this theory, when women and minorities came into the profession in significant 
numbers, they undermined the profession's ability to identify and perpetuate a commitment to the common 
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The legal profession cannot claim the high moral ground of seeking 
justice for all and at the same time neglect barriers to the successful 
participation of women and minorities in the legal profession. Numer-
ous reports show us how, but response has been sluggish. For example, 
the recent publication, "The Unfinished Agenda," by the ABA 
Commission on Women in the Profession, concludes that equality for 
women in the profession continues to be elusive. Few of the problems 
reflect intentional discrimination; women's opportunities are limited by 
traditional gender schema and inflexible workplace structures, to name 
just two remaining issues. 100 
Meeting these four challenges requires first that we think about the 
concept of professionalism as both simpler and more profound than 
adhering to particular kinds of conduct, eliminating commercialism and 
entrepreneurial efforts, or teaching new law students or new lawyers the 
correct values before they go wrong. Professionalism education means 
going beyond these worthy efforts to consider the first principles of 
achieving and maintaining competence, acting with integrity, commit-
ting to service, and seeking justice for all. 101 
We can draw upon numerous examples from our lives as lawyers to 
develop the ideal of professionalism. At the most fundamental level, 
representing a client to help that client realize ambitions or goals, or to 
avoid the imposition of power resides at the heart of justice. If that 
representation is undertaken competently, independently, and without 
conflict, then justice will be served. Legal representation is an awesome 
responsibility, and individual reflection on its application goes to the 
core of professionalism. 
good. Russell G. Pearce, ~ers as America's Gomning Class; The Formation and Dissolution,!! fhe Origintd 
Understanding,!! the American ~er's Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 412 (200 I). 
100. DEBORAH L. RHODE, A.B.A. CmlMISSIONONWOMEN INTHEPROF~SION, THE UNFINISHED 
AGEXDA: WmlEx A~D THE LEGAL PRO~SIOX 6 (200 I). 
101. The practical challenge presented to legal educators and to judges and lawyers involved in 
professionalism continuing legal education is to convert these concepts into a list of concrete steps that law 
students and lawyers will find more immediately applicable. In making that com'ersion, a long list of 
suggested issues and topics have been identified by Profession~lism Commissions as appropriate for 
professionalism CLE. 
Ohio Professionalism CLE Guidelines state expressly that the ideals and values in the Lawyers 
Creed and the Aspirational Ideals which were adopted in 1997, as well as those in the more recently adopted 
Judicial Creed (200 I), should be used to suggest issues and subjects that lawyers and judges need to examine 
as they strive to meet the lofty goals and ideals, and to achieve the highest standards of a learned profession. 
St:PRE~IE COURT OF OHIO COM~IlSSI0N ON PROF~SIONAUSM,PROFESSIONAUSM CLE GUlDEUN~ 
Gun. 14,2002), at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/CP/guidelines.pdf. 
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CONCLUSION 
Clearly, professionalism is a concept broader than legal ethics. Yet, 
in our minds and in our discussions, legal ethics precedes professional-
ism for several reasons. First and most obviously, it is a fact that legal 
ethics precedes professionalism as a historical matter. A discussion of 
ethics pervades the 19th and 20th centuries, and professionalism is late 
to arrive at the tail end of the 20th century. It is also the case that legal 
ethics rules as we have come to know them are more congenial to the 
formal legalistic mind. As lawyers we understand better how to read, 
interpret, dissect, and apply rules, than how to define, understand, and 
achieve aspirational standards. We have, after all, been educated as 
Holmes's bad man. 
Next, the fact that ethics precedes professionalism is reinforced as the 
legal profession undergoes dramatic changes. More specifically, the 
profession, with increased competition and decreased loyalty, finds 
disciplinary rules easier both to administer and to understand, while 
finding aspirational standards not only difficult to define, but also not 
economically worth the effort. finally, the lack of a dear or accepted 
definition of professionalism makes an attempt to codify it difficult, if not 
impossible. 102 
Legal ethics and professionalism are distinct but related ways of 
thinking about lawyer's obligations. Professionalism can be a much less 
maligned idea if we articulate. the proper relationship between legal 
ethics and professionalism. Further, we must understand that although 
professionalism is a broader idea, it nevertheless has distinctive 
characteristics. Where legal ethics is rule .. based, event-specific, 
retrospective, and disciplinary, calling for the exercise of good judgment, 
professionalism is standard-based, career-long, prospective, and 
aspirational, calling for the exercise of wisdom. 
Ethics 2000 and The Law Governing Lawyers present an opportunity for 
lawyers to reassess their professional codes in light of modern develop-
ments and maybe even with an eye on professionalism. This is a 
challenge for neither the weak-willed nor the short-winded; but it is a 
challenge worth undertaking for the improvement of the legal profession 
which comes with being a member of the bar. 
These interactions are the stuff of better education. 103 
102. Despite scholarship of Pound, Cramton, Stanley, Redlick, l\IacCrate, etc., the only good 
definition of professionalism is the one you develop for yourself. 
103. TEACHING & LEARNING PROFESSIONAUSM, supra note 63; ABA SEC. OF LEGAL EDCC. AND 
AmIISSIONS TO THE BAR, PROFESSIONAUS~f CO~IMIlTEE& STASDING COM~UlTEF.s ON PROFESSIOl\A. 
US~I AND L~WYER COMPETENCE OF THE ABA CTR. FOR PROF. RE.'iPOSSIBIUTY, TEACHING AND 
LEAR:\,I:\'G PROFESSIONAUSM: SnlPOSImI PROCEEDISGS (October 2.4, 1996). 
